Thomas Suchocki v. Chris Gilchrist by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-26-2015 
Thomas Suchocki v. Chris Gilchrist 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Thomas Suchocki v. Chris Gilchrist" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 81. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/81 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 14-1073 
____________ 
 
THOMAS SUCHOCKI, 
 
                                          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SERGEANT CHRIS GILCHRIST;  
PAULSBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
CITY OF PAULSBORO; LOGAN TOWNSHIP 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 11-cv-04626) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 15, 2015 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  January 26, 2015) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Thomas Suchocki appeals the District Court’s summary judgment disposing of his 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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claims against police officer Chris Gilcrest, the city of Paulsboro, New Jersey, and the 
Paulsboro Police Department. 
I 
 We confine ourselves to Suchocki’s account of the episode that precipitated this 
lawsuit, which Defendants vigorously dispute, because summary judgment is appropriate only 
when a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmovant even if it accepted his version of the 
facts. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
 On the afternoon of May 28, 2010, Suchocki stopped his truck at an intersection in 
Paulsboro where Gilcrest was working as a crossing guard. When the traffic light turned 
green, a car in front of Suchocki made a left, causing Gilcrest to become angry. Gilcrest then 
“turned his anger to” Suchocki, “screaming and hollering” at him. App. 40–41. Speaking 
through his window, Suchocki said, “I don’t know what you want. . . . [W]hat do you want? 
What do you want?” and raised his hands in frustration. App. 41. Gilcrest ordered Suchocki to 
pull over, and he complied. 
 When Gilcrest approached the truck, Suchocki asked, “What did I do?” App. 42. “You 
wouldn’t let me do my job,” Gilcrest said. Id. “I don’t think you know how to do your job,” 
Suchocki retorted. Id. As Suchocki reached for his license and registration, he used his cell 
phone to call his attorney, but Gilcrest ordered him to turn the phone off and hand it over. 
Suchocki, who has a disability, opened the driver’s side door slightly to make it easier to get 
his license, prompting Gilcrest to force it shut. Gilcrest then ordered Suchocki out of the 
truck. Suchocki remembers demanding to talk to a supervisor, though he does not know 
exactly when he did so. 
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 After Suchocki got out of the truck, Gilcrest left briefly to help children cross the 
intersection. Upon his return, he started writing a ticket and told Suchocki “that he didn’t like 
my attitude. He was trying to do his job, and he would lock me up.” App. 46. “[I]f you are 
going to lock me the fuck up, lock me up,” Suchocki replied. Id. Gilcrest then arrested him 
and called for another officer to bring him to the police station. Gilcrest later arrived at the 
station and questioned Suchocki without allowing him to see his lawyer. Suchocki was 
released and charged with two offenses: harassment, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-
4(c), and obstructing the administration of law, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1(a). 
The charges were ultimately dismissed. 
 This appeal concerns the viability of Suchocki’s federal claims against Gilcrest, the city 
of Paulsboro, and the police department. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Suchocki contends 
that Gilcrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause. 
He also seeks to impose municipal liability upon Paulsboro and its police department on the 
theory that the city caused Suchocki’s constitutional injury by failing to adequately train or 
supervise Gilcrest. The District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants because it 
concluded that Gilcrest had probable cause to arrest Suchocki even under Suchocki’s version 
of the facts, meaning there was no false arrest. Suchocki v. Gilcrest, 2013 WL 6858708, at *6 
(D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2013).1 We will affirm. 
II 
 Our review of a summary judgment is plenary. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 
                                                 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). “We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by the 
record.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 
A 
 In granting summary judgment on the false arrest claim, the District Court held that 
undisputed facts indicate that Suchocki’s arrest was prompted by his “cursing, argumentative 
behavior, and demand that [Gilcrest] ‘lock [him] up,’ all of which prevented [Gilcrest] from 
returning to his traffic posting” and established probable cause for arrest. Suchocki, 2013 WL 
6858708, at *6. Suchocki’s main claim is that his behavior was not egregious enough to 
create probable cause to arrest him for harassment under § 2C:33-4(c) or obstructing the 
administration of law under § 2C:29-1(a). 
 Even if it were true that a reasonable police officer would not have found probable 
cause to arrest under those specific statutory provisions, however, the District Court did not 
err by granting summary judgment. “[I]t is irrelevant to the probable cause analysis what crime 
a suspect is eventually charged with,” so there was no false arrest unless probable cause was 
lacking to arrest Suchocki for any offense. Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 
602 (3d Cir. 2005). And even under Suchocki’s version of the facts, probable cause existed to 
arrest him under at least one subsection of the harassment statute, which generally 
criminalizes “private annoyances that are not entitled to constitutional protection.” State v. 
Hoffman, 695 A.2d 236, 242 (N.J. 1997). For example, subsection (a) of the statute prohibits 
simply “communicat[ing] in a ‘manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm’” with intent to 
harass. Id. (quoting § 2C:33-4(a)).  
 Suchocki admits that he spoke to Gilcrest in a needlessly confrontational, coarse 
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manner during their encounter. He repeatedly asked Gilcrest what he wanted, told Gilcrest that 
he did not know how to do his job, and told him, “[I]f you are going to lock me the fuck up, 
lock me up.” Although it is possible that this behavior would have been insufficient to convict 
Suchocki of violating even § 2C:33-4(a), it was certainly enough to give Gilcrest probable 
cause to arrest him. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“We have made 
clear that the kinds and degree of proof . . . necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to 
a valid arrest.”). The District Court therefore did not err by granting Gilcrest summary 
judgment on Suchocki’s false arrest claim. 
B 
 It follows a fortiori that the District Court also correctly entered judgment for 
Paulsboro and its police department on the failure to train and supervise claims. A 
municipality cannot be liable for a constitutional transgression by its agent that never 
occurred. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam). 
III 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment for 
Defendants. 
